Abstract. We show a construction of the square principle ω 1 by means of forcing with finite conditions.
Introduction
The square principle on a cardinal κ states that there is a sequence C α indexed by the limit ordinals in [κ, κ + ) such that each C α is a club subset of α of order type ≤ κ and the sequence is coherent in the sense that if β is a limit point of α then C β = C α ∩ β. This principle is a feature of the constructible universe L which was discovered by Jensen and used by him to show the existence of an ω 2 -Souslin tree in L [7] . The related principle ♦, which was used to construct an ω 1 -Souslin tree in L by Jensen, may also be added or destroyed by forcing as wished (see [10] for examples and discussion) and as is known of recently ( [12] ) at κ ≥ ω 2 which are successors of regular cardinals, it is simply equivalent to GCH. However, is connected to large cardinals. For example, by an old proof of Solovay [13] , square cannot hold above a supercompact cardinal, and on smaller cardinals, it cannot hold in the presence of forcing axioms, e.g. Todorčević [14] proved that PFA implies that for all κ ≥ ω 2 , κ fails. Therefore can be seen as a reflection principle inimical to large cardinals, and in fact by varying the definition of square by allowing a cardinal parameter which measures how many guesses to C α we are allowed at each α, we obtain a hierarchy of principles of decreasing strength which can be used to test consistency strength of various principles (see more on this in [3] ). In the light of these facts it is natural that the question of how to add or destroy a square principle by forcing has been a central theme. See [3] for a description of some of the many known results including versions of an older result of Magidor in which a square sequence is added by forcing.
The way that Magidor adds a square is to force by initial segments along a closed bounded subsets of the domain, and to use the existence of the "top" point in the domain of a forcing condition to show that the forcing is strategically closed. Note that the principle ω is trivially true, by taking C α to be any club of α of order type ω, so the first non-trivial instance of square is ω1 . Magidor's method means that to get ω1 we need to force with conditions whose domain has size ω 1 . In this work we have been interested to do this differently, using conditions whose domain is a finite set. The interest in doing this stems from a need to understand how one can control a one cardinal gap in forcing notions, which is a subject that has been of interest for various combinatorial issues for a long time. A glaring example of the need to develop this subject is the combinatorics of (ω ω1 1 , ≤ Fin ), which in contrast with the vast body of knowledge about (ω ω , ≤ Fin ) remains a mysterious object. An important development on the subject of (ω ω1 1 , ≤ Fin ) is Koszmider's paper [9] in which he shows that it is consistent to have an increasing chain of length ω 2 in this structure. Koszmider's paper also gives an overview of the difficulties that there are in forcing one gap results.
Koszmider's method is to force with conditions where a morass is used as a side condition. Our method is more directly connected to a different approach, which was used to force a club on ω 2 using finite conditions. This was done in two different but similar ways by Friedman in [5] and Mitchell in [11] . Both approaches are built upon a version of adding a square on ω 1 using finite conditions, as discovered by Baumgartner [2] and modified by Abraham in [1] . The main idea in Baumgartner's approach is that to force a club in ω 1 and avoid problems at the limit stages, one needs to specify by each condition not only what will go in the club, but also whole intervals that need to stay out of it. At ω 2 one can do the same, but now one needs to add side conditions in the form of coherent systems of models in order to make sure that cardinals are preserved, as was first done by Todorčević in [15] . This already is technically rather involved. What we have done is add to this the coherent partial square sequence. Namely, we actually force a square indexed by a club sequencethe existence of such a square implies the existence of an actual square sequence. This club set is like the one added by Friedman and Mitchell. The actual forcing notion needs to take into account the coherence of the square sequence, and this is reflected in the complexity of the coherence conditions between the models which form part of the forcing conditions. An advantage of this type of approach over the morass-based approach is that it requires less from the ground model -for example Friedman's forcing only needs a weakening of CH in the ground model. We use the full CH together with 2 ω1 = ω 2 . The main difficulties of both approaches of course are the same, and they stem from the fact that combinatorics at ω 2 is much less prone to independence than the combinatorics at ω 1 , as exemplified by the above mentioned result of Shelah on ♦ ( [12] ). It is both in developing combinatorics and fine forcing techniques that we can better understand the truth about ω 2 .
We thank Boban Veličković for interesting discussions of Mitchell's paper and an inspiration to consider forcing square with finite conditions.
Preliminaries
Most of the notation is standard. Relation A ⊂ B means that A is either a proper subset of B or equal to B. |X| is the cardinality of set X. For a set of ordinals X, a limit point of X is an ordinal α such that α = sup(Y ) for some Y ⊂ X or, equivalently, if α = sup(X ∩ α). Lim(X) is a set of limit points of X. For a function f , D f denotes the domain of f , and f | A denotes the restriction of f to the set A ∩ D f . If α and β are ordinals then the interval (α, β) denotes the set {µ | µ is an ordinal, α < µ < β} = β \ (α + 1). Closed and half open interval are defined similarly. [A] κ is the set of all subsets of A of cardinality κ. Set [A] ≤κ is defined analogously.
For a regular cardinal θ, H θ is the set of all sets x with hereditary cardinality less than θ (i.e. the transitive closure of x has cardinality less than θ). For θ > ω 2 we consider H θ to be a model with the standard relation ∈ and a fixed well-ordering ≤ * . We will primarily work with H ω2 which we view as a model with ∈ and ≤ * ↾ H ω2 . Cardinal θ is said to be large enough if every set in consideration is an element of
(1) for every increasing sequence α i | i < λ of elements from C, for some λ < κ, we have i<λ α i ∈ C (closed);
(2) for every α < κ there exists some β ∈ C such that β > α (unbounded).
The assumption that κ is a regular cardinal can be replaced by a singular cardinal or even an ordinal. In that case, λ from clause (1) has to be below cf(κ). In fact, clause (1) can be replaced by equivalent notion, that Lim(C) ∩ κ ⊂ C.
In case κ = ω 1 , the nontriviality clause simply stipulates that if cf(α) = ω then |C α | = ω.
We shall call sequence C α | α ∈ C for some set C ⊂ Lim(κ + ) a square-like sequence if it is fulfilling all three clauses of the definition of a square sequence.
Background on elementary submodels
A model M is an elementary submodel of a model N , M ≺ N , if for every formula ϕ with parameters a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ M , ϕ is true in M if and only if it is true in N . If M is a countable elementary submodel of H θ for θ ≥ ω 1 then M ∩ ω 1 is an ordinal denoted by δ M . Also, if |x| ≤ ω and x ∈ M then x ⊂ M .
We begin by listing a few lemmas about elementary submodels which will come in handy later on. We add proofs for completeness. When dealing with elementary submodels, the Tarski-Vaught test [8] comes as a very useful tool. . . , a n ) and a 1 . . . , a n ∈ M , if N |= ∃xφ(x, a 1 , . . . , a n ) then there exists b ∈ M such that N |= φ(b, a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Proof. Let a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ N ∩ H ω2 and suppose that H ω2 |= ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) where ψ is the formula ∃xφ(x, a 1 , . . . , a n ). Then ψ Hω 2 -the relativization of ψ to H ω2 -is true. Formula ψ Hω 2 is equivalent to the formula ψ * obtained by replacing every occurence of ∃y ∈ H ω2 χ(y, . . . ) with ∃y(χ(y, . . . ) ∧ | tr cl(y)| ≤ ω 1 ), and similarly for the universal quantifier. We get φ * from φ in the same way. Now, H θ |= ψ * (a 1 , . . . , a n ), or in other words,
. . , a n ), and as a consequence, H ω2 |= φ(b, a 1 . . . , a n ), which by Tarski-Vaught test means that
Proof. Let a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ N ∩ M and suppose that H ω2 |= ∃xφ(x, a 1 , . . . , a n ). Let ψ(x, a 1 , . . . , , a n ) be the formula φ(x, a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∧ ∀y(φ(y, a 1 , . . . , a n ) → x ≤ * y). Then H ω2 |= ∃xψ(x, a 1 , . . . , a n ). By Tarski-Vaught test there exist x 1 ∈ M and x 2 ∈ N such that H ω2 |= ψ(x 1 , a 1 , . . . , a n ) and H ω2 |= ψ(x 2 , a 1 , . . . , a n ). But then
Suppose now that α < sup(N ) and let β := sup(M ∩ α) and
Hence, by elementarity, β ∈ N , and therefore β < sup(N ∩ α). √
The standard reference for basic set-theoretic notions and facts is [6] . Additional source for results on elementary models in a very concise form is [4] , as well as [8] .
In our application of elementary submodels we will basically only be interested in the ordinals that lie inside them. To simplify the notation we will write M for a model and M for its set of ordinals M ∩ Ord. We will use the term "model" for both M and M .
Forcing a square
Let V be some countable transitive model of (a sufficiently large finite fragment of) ZFC together with CH and "2 ω1 = ω 2 ". Since we want to force the existence of a square sequence, the working part of forcing notion P will consist of finite partial square sequences. We will add safeguards which will help us separate clubs from condition q and clubs from restriction p ≤ q. This will be instrumental in the proof of properness.
It should be noted once again that we do not have to build a square sequence on the whole Lim(ω 2 ). Instead, it is enough for the domain of the built sequence to be a club in ω 2 , because we can always extend a square sequence from a club to the full Lim(ω 2 ) (see Lemma 5.13) . This is the reason why we add intervals as a part of conditions. These intervals will serve as gaps in what will ultimately be the desired club in Lim(ω 2 ). This way of forcing a club was introduced by Baumgartner in [2] .
Before we are ready to present the definition of forcing we have to define a few auxiliary notions. For α < ω 2 , cf(α) = ω 1 , let E α denote some fixed countable set of clubs in α of order type ω 1 , and
The set M 0 will act as a pool of possible side conditions.
For a large enough cardinal θ let (a) either
The set in (b) is called the set of M 1 -fences for M 2 . This definition of compatibility between elementary submodels (or in this case their sets of ordinals) is due to Mitchell [11] . In fact, this version is a slight strengthening of Mitchell's compatibility condition. The need for a slightly stronger version stems from the fact that we have to work with sets of ordinals, namely clubs, instead of just ordinals. Actually, workng with sets of ordinals adds a whole new level of difficulty to the forcing construction and most of the effort had to be invested to this end.
The following simple lemma shows that our version of compatibility between two models is indeed stronger than Mitchell's version.
Proof. Consider α ∈ M 1 ∩ δ, and let A be some ω-sequence of ordinals smaller than
In lieu of the above lemma, we will say that the intersection M 1 ∩ M 2 is an initial segment of M 1 whenever clause (a) of Definition 4.1 holds.
Remark 4.3. If M 1 and M 2 are compatible then their structure vis-a-vis each other is particularly simple. Above sup(M 1 ∩ M 2 ) they consist of finitely many (not necessarily continuous) interchanging blocks, as witnessed by both fences. Below, they are either equal or one is a subset of the other. Namely, if there exist
is not an initial segment of either of them, hence it is an element of both M 1 and M 2 . Therefore,
, which is obviously a contradiction. 
Definition 4.4. The forcing notion P is a set of conditions of the form
Clause (6b) tells us that a gap in a model M has to be closed from above by a safeguard if there is something (i.e. an ordinal α ∈ D p ) inside that gap. This safeguard is an echo of α resonating in M , warning everybody in M to stay away from that gap. Fences from clause (9) serve exactly the same purpose.
Notice that in clause (8) Proof. Transitivity is trivial. The minimal element is (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅). For separativeness consider an arbitrary condition p ∈ P . We will find two incompatible extensions.
are both conditions extending p, and that they are incompatible. Notice, that since cf(β) = ω, C β and C ′ β need not be in E β . √
We first prove several lemmas that show us a little bit more about the structure of conditions in P , and will be helpful in further proofs. Most notably, they will shed some lights on the correspondence between models and clubs, and thus clarify clause (6) . Lemma 4.6. Let p ∈ P , and suppose that α, γ ∈ D p and M ∈ M p are such that
Proof. By (6b), σ := min(M \ α) ∈ S p , hence if γ > σ then, by (5), C γ has no limit points below σ. √ Notice that if α ∈ Lim(C γ ) then cf(α) = ω, otherwise C γ would have order type larger than ω 1 .
Lemma 4.7. If p, α, γ and M are as in the previous lemma and max{γ
Proof. If α > sup(M ) then the conclusion follows from clauses (3) and (5) . Suppose now that α < sup(M ) and α ∈ Lim(C γ ). Then γ ∈ M and sup(M ∩ γ) > γ. If γ is not a limit point of any C γ ′ then, by (6c),
and we can repeat the above argument. As |D p | < ω, we only have to repeat it finitely many times, and in the end we can conclude that
Proof. By clauses (3) and (5), sup(M ) cannot be a limit point of any
For every α ∈ N such that α = sup(N ∩ γ) for some γ ∈ D p , let C α be a club according to clause (6d). In the case of α ∈ Lim(C β ) for some β ∈ D p this choice is well-defined because by clause (4) it does not depend on β. It is worth mentioning that cf(α) = ω, hence C α need not be in E α . Notice, that by Lemma 3.4, cf(γ) = ω 1 . Therefore, γ is already in S p and does not have to be added for clause (6b) to be satisfied. We will also have to add sup(N ) to the set of safeguards. For the corresponding club C sup(N ) we pick any cofinal ω-sequence. Again, cf(sup(M )) = ω, therefore C sup(M) des not have to be in E sup(M) .
Define
Most of the clauses of definition 4.4 are trivially true, including clause (6), which is due to the fact that we used clause (6) to construct additional clubs. These new clubs conform to clauses (1) and (4) as well, since clause (6d) was added specifically for this purpose. Notice, that for M ∈ M p the M -fence for N is the empty set, while the N -fence for M is {sup(M ∩ N )} = {sup(M )} which is a subset of S p ⊂ S q by clause (3). As for clause (7) , suppose that some newly added α < sup(N ) falls into some interval (β ′ , β]. Then its corresponding γ ∈ D p was already in this interval, since {β ′ , β} ⊂ N . But that is in a contradiction with clause (7) in p.
Hence q is the desired condition extending p. √ Lemma 4.10. Let N ∈ M 1 be a countable elementary submodel of H ω2 , and suppose that r ∈ P \ N is such that N ∈ M r . Then
Proof. First note that by clause (6a),
It is obvious that r N ∈ N . Slightly less trivial thing to prove is that r N ∈ P . Compatibility between the elements of F r , S r , O r and M r is inherited from r, as is the compatibility between two models from M r . The same can be said for the compatibility between F r N , O r N and a model of the form M ∩ N ∈ M r N , however with a closer inspection of clause (6) .
For clause (6c) assume that α ∈ M ∩ N is such that sup((M ∩ N ) ∩ α) < α < sup(M ∩ N ). The only potential problem is if α ∈ Lim(C β ) for some β ∈ D r while α ∈ γ∈Dr N Lim(C γ ). In such a case, by Lemma 4.6, β ≤ min(M \ α). In fact,
For clause (6d) assume that α is a supremum of a block of M ∩ N . Let us ask ourselves a question. Is it possible that α is a limit point of some C β in r but not in r N ? It is only possible if α = sup(M ∩ N ). Otherwise, as above, min(M \ α) ∈ S r which makes it the only candidate for β. However, this β and C β remain in r N and do not answer our question affirmatively. On the other hand sup(M ∩ N ) ∈ S r by (9) in r and hence by (5) cannot be a limit point of any C β , neither in r nor in r N .
The thing that merits the closest attention is the compatibility between two models of the form
Here we use the fact that
We have to consider three cases.
Case 1: λ ∈ M 2 . Then, by elementarity,
, and again we get a contradiction.
Both possibilities lead to a contradiction. We are now ready to prove the most important facet of forcing P , namely the fact that it preserves ω 1 . We do that by proving that P is proper. There are several equivalent definitions of properness. We shall use the following one. ω . (1) Condition q ∈ P is N -generic if for every extension r ≥ q, r ∈ P , and every dense set D ⊂ P , D ∈ N , there exists some condition s ∈ D ∩ N which is compatible with r.
(2) P is proper if for every N ∈ N such that P ∈ N , every condition p ∈ P ∩N has an N -generic extension. Proof. Let θ be a large enough cardinal. Fix a countable elementary submodel N ′ ≺ H θ , N ′ ∈ M 1 , such that P ∈ N ′ , and consider an arbitrary p = (
and let q be an extension of p given by Lemma 4.9. We will prove that q is an N ′ -generic extension of p. Suppose r ∈ P is an arbitrary extension of q. Let r N be the condition given by Lemma 4.10. Proceed by fixing a dense open subset D ⊂ P , D ∈ N ′ , and extend r N to s ∈ D ∩ N ′ . Clearly s ∈ H ω2 , hence s ∈ N . We shall prove that r and s are compatible by proving clause by clause of Definition 4.4 that (a certain extension
Clauses (1), (2) and (3) are obviously true. Clause (4): take arbitrary α, β ∈ D t . We can assume WLOG that α ∈ D r \ D s and β ∈ D s \ D r . If β > α then there are two possibilities. If β = min(N \ α) then β ∈ S r ⊂ D r by (6b) in r, which we assumed was not the case.
If β < sup(N ) ≤ α then C α ∩ β is finite either by Lemma 4.8 or clause (5) in r, hence Lim(C α ) ∩ Lim(C β ) = ∅. If β < α < sup(N ), then by clause (6c) or (6d) in r, either C α ∩ δ is finite for every δ < sup(N ∩ α) including β, or C α = C γ ′ ∩ α for some γ ′ ∈ D r . In the latter case let γ be the largest such γ ′ . By Lemma 4.6, γ ≤ min(N \ α). If γ < min(N \ α) then C α ∩ β is finite by Lemma 4.7, because β < sup(N ∩ α). If γ = min(N \ α) ∈ D s and if C α and C β have a common limit point µ, then µ ∈ Lim(C γ ), hence C β ∩ µ = C γ ∩ µ = C α ∩ µ. The first equality follows from (4) in s and the second follows from (4) in r.
If sup(N ∩α) = α then the argument is similar. If C α is an ω-sequence of ordinals then (4) is trivially true. If C α = C γ ∩ α for some γ ∈ D r and if α < sup(N ), then γ = min(N \ α). Notice that if γ were below min(N \ α) then C α would be finite by (6c) in r. Now we get (4) in t just as above. If α = sup(N ) then C α were again finite by (6c) or even (5) in r.
Clause (5): first consider arbitrary α ∈ D r \ D s and σ ∈ S s \ S r , σ < α. By (6c) or (6d) in r, either C α = C γ ∩ α for some γ ∈ D r , or C α ∩ δ is a finite set for every δ < sup(N ∩ α). The second case is trivial, because σ ∈ N , hence σ < sup(N ∩ α). In the first case, if α < sup(N ) then we can assume that γ = min(N \ α) ∈ D s . Hence, C α ∩ σ = C γ ∩ σ which is a finite set by (5) If α ∈ D s \ D r and σ ∈ S r \ S s , σ < α, then min(
which is a finite set by (5) in s.
Clause (6) : first consider arbitrary α ∈ D r \ D s and a M ∈ M s \ M r . Then α ∈ N ⊃ M and sup(M ∩ α) < α by Lemma 3.5. We argue just like for clause (5) . Either C α = C γ ∩ α for some γ ∈ D r ⊂ D t , and we get (6c) in t, or C α ∩ δ is a finite set for every δ < sup(N ∩ α). Since sup(M ∩ α) < sup(N ∩ α), we also get (6c).
Additionally
Additionally (and also if α > sup(M )), if there is no δ ∈ D t such that α ∈ Lim(C δ ) then C α ∩ sup(M ∩ α) is finite, because either there is some γ ∈ M , sup(M ∩ N ) < γ < α, in which case σ := min(N \ γ) ∈ S r ∩ N ⊂ S s by (9) in r, or else σ := min(N \ sup(M ∩ N )) ∈ S r ∩ N , because σ is in the N -fence for M . In both cases C α ∩ sup(M ∩ α) ⊂ C α ∩ σ which is finite by (5) in s. Hence, we got (6c) which we had to get, because sup(M ∩ α) < α. Notice, that if sup(M ∩ α) = α then α is a minimum of a block in N and consequently α ∈ S r ⊂ D r by (9) in r, which is also the case if α = sup(M ∩ N ).
However (4) which was already proved for t, C α = C δ ∩ α.
If α ∈ M then we have to consider two possibilities. The first case is if
If, on the other hand, M ∩ N is an initial segment of N , and if cf(α) = ω then, We also have to consider the possibility that sup(M ∩α) < α. Then sup(M ∩α) ≥ sup(N ∩ α). Here we are in trouble because α knows nothing about M , so there is no reason to believe that sup(M ∩ α) is either in D r or in D s . In fact, it is certainly not in D r because then α would also be in D r by (6b) in r applied on M and sup(M ∩ α). This is the reason why we have to enlarge D t with every possible β := sup(M ∩ α) for all pairs α ∈ D s \ D r and countable M ∈ M r \ M s such that M ∩ N ∈ N , α < sup(M ∩ N ) and sup(M ∩ α) < α. Notice, that this way we also prove the consistency between α and N . C β 's have to be chosen according to (6d) in t. The precise definition will follow. Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that β ∈ D t , hence C β is a new club, and we are not in danger of overwriting an existing club with a new and different one. If β were present in t it could only come from r, as β ∈ N . But then α itself would be present by (6b) in r. Also, cf(β) = ω, hence we need not worry about E β .
We have to check that every new β and its club are compatible with everything in t. Club C β is compatible with all the other clubs as well as with S t because of its construction. Point β is compatible with O t because α is -at least it will be, once we prove clause (7) in t. The only nontrivial thing to check is the compatibility between β and M ′ ∈ M r \ M s . If M ′ ∈ M s then the compatibility follows from compatibility between α and M ′ in s. Similarly, we only have to consider M ′ such that M ′ ∩N ∈ N , otherwise we simply use either the compatibility between M ′ ∩N and α in s if α < sup(M ′ ∩ N ), or the compatibility between M ′ and N in r if
Suppose that M ′ is as described. If sup(M ∩ M ′ ) < β < sup(M ′ ) then the block of M with supremum β lies in a gap of M ′ . But then, by (9) in r, min(M ′ \ β) ∈ S r , and consequently sup(M ′ ∩ β) ∈ D r by (6b) in r. In fact, in this case β was already present in r and did not have to be added. If
However, if C β is an ω-sequence then it has to be chosen so that it is an element of every such M ′ . Therefore, the precise definition of C β is this: if
In the second case, we can find such ω-sequence by elementarity, since a finite intersection of elementary submodels of H ω2 is itself an elementary submodel of H ω2 .
If
, which had to be added to D t just like β. Additionally, β is inside a gap of M ′ and C β is compatible with M ′ because it was constructed in the spirit of (6d). Now, 
which is in a direct contradiction with (7) in s.
Clause (8) : start with some (β (9) in r, there is an x from the N -fence for M in the interval. But x ∈ S r ∩ N ⊂ S s , a contradiction.
Clause (9): consider arbitrary models M ∈ M r \ M s and 
Let us now establish the existence of fences. The M -fence for M ′ is some subset of the union of the M -fence for N and
, and this union is a subset of S r ∪ S s = S t .
Let x ⊂ S r ∩ N be the N -fence for M and y ⊂ S s the
We have thus far proved that forcing with P preserves ω 1 . We also need ω 2 to be preserved. For that purpose we use a weaker version of closedness, which was also used in [11] .
Definition 5.1. Assume that forcing notion P preserves cardinals < δ. P is δ-
Notice that since P preserves cardinals below δ,
Hence we can omit the superscript. Proof. Suppose A ⊂ V and |A| V [G] < δ. Let p ∈ G be a condition such that p " |A | < δ ". Therefore p " there exists µ < δ such that |A | = µ ". Let p 0 ≥ p, g and µ * < δ be such that p 0 " g : µ * → A is a bijection ". For each α < µ * let A α be a maximal antichain of conditions in the set {q | (q ≥ p 0 ∧ q decides g(α)) ∨ q⊥p 0 }. Hence A α is a maximal antichain above p 0 . Define A := {A α | α < µ * }. Let D be a dense set guaranteed by the assumption, and let p 1 ∈ D, p 1 ≥ p 0 . Then the set X := {q ∈ α<µ * A α | q is compatible with p 1 } has size < δ. Let Γ := {β | there exist q ∈ X and α < µ * such that q " g (α) = β "}. Consider an arbitrary α < µ * . Since A α is a maximal antichain there exists some q ∈ A α , compatible with p 1 , such that q decides g(α). Hence there exists β such that q " g (α) = β ", and therefore β ∈ Γ. Let r be a common upper bound for q and p 1 . Then r " g (α) = β ", and since r ≥ p 0 , p 0 " there exists β ∈ Γ such that g (α) = β ". It follows that p 0 " g (α) ∈ Γ ", so
Since δ is regular in V , we have |Γ| < δ, therefore p " there exists
The next lemma shows that δ-presaturation is, in fact, a generalization of properness to cardinals above ω 1 .
Lemma 5.4. Let δ be a cardinal regular in V such that P preserves cardinals below δ. Suppose that θ is a large enough cardinal, and that for stationarily many models
<δ with P ∈ N , and for each p ∈ P ∩ N , there exists an N -generic extension q ≥ p. Then P is δ-presaturated.
Proof. Suppose A ⊂ V and µ := |A| V [G] < δ. Let f be a function and let p ∈ G be a condition such that p " f : µ → A is onto ". Define N := {N ≺ H θ | |N | < δ, {f, A, p, P } ∪ µ ⊂ N }. Consider some N ∈ N. Let q ≥ p be a generic extension. Then for every ξ < µ, the set D ξ := {r ∈ N | r decides f (ξ)} ∈ N is dense above q. Hence q " D ∩ G ∩ N = ∅ ". Therefore q forces that there exist r ξ ∈ G ∩ N and
Since presaturation is a generalization of properness, the proof will be very similar to the proof of properness. Actually, it will be slightly easier, because we will not work with arbitrary models of size ω 1 but only with such models that are in a way transitive below ω 2 .
Recall that we have assumed CH so that the set M 2 is stationary in
To prove Proposition 5.5, we first isolate a lemma which is an analogue of Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 5.7. Let N ∈ M 2 , and r ∈ P such that δ N ∈ S r . Then r N defined by
It is also of some importance that by clause (6a),
Now we have to show, just as in the proof of Lemma 4.10, that r N is a condition. By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3, M ∩ N ≺ H ω2 . At the same time, M ∩ N ∈ M 0 , therefore M ∩ N can be justifiably added to M r N . Since δ N ∈ S r , it follows that sup(M ∩ N ) ∈ D r ∩ N = D r N by clause (6b). We can safely put it into S r N without violating clause (5), because we can apply Lemma 4.7.
Just as in the proof of Lemma 4.10, we only have to pay attention to clauses (6) and (9) in conjecture with a model of the form M ∩ N .
If α ∈ M ∩ N then C α ∈ M by (6a) in r. If cf(α) = ω then C α ∈ N , because N is countably closed. If cf(α) = ω 1 then C α ∈ N , because C α = C \ β for some C ∈ E α ⊂ N and β ∈ D r ∩ α ⊂ N . In any case, C α ∈ M ∩ N . The danger with clauses (6c) and (6d) is if α ∈ N is in a gap of M ∩ N and α ∈ Lim(C γ ) for some γ ∈ D r \ N . But then γ > δ N ∈ S r , hence α ∈ Lim(C γ ).
is obtained in the same way. √ Proof (of Proposition 5.5). Let θ be a large enough cardinal. Pick N ∈ M 2 and p ∈ P ∩ N . We extend p to q by putting δ N into both D p and S p . For the corresponding club C δN we take C \ max(D p ) for some C ∈ E δN . Clearly, q ∈ P .
Possible complication: is C δ in E δ ?
We will prove that q is an N -generic extension of p. Suppose r is an arbitrary extension of q, and let r N be as given by the previous lemma. For a fixed dense set D ⊂ P , D ∈ N , extend r N to s ∈ D. Then s ∈ N . As with properness, we will prove clause by clause of Definition 4.4 that t := (F r ∪ F s , S r ∪ S s , O r ∪ O s , M r ∪ M s ) is a condition. Fortunately, less effort will have to be invested, because N ∩ H ω2 has no gaps.
Clauses (1), (2) and (3) need no comments. Clause (4) : suppose that α ∈ D r \ D s and β ∈ D s \ D r . Then C α ∩ N is a finite set because δ N ∈ S r , and C β ⊂ N , hence Lim(C α ) ∩ Lim(C β ) = ∅.
Clause (5): if α ∈ D r \ D s and σ ∈ S s \ S r then C α ∩ σ ⊂ C α ∩ δ N , which is a finite set.
Clause (6) : if α ∈ D r \ D s and M ∈ M s \ M r then there is nothing to prove. Suppose now that α ∈ D s \ D r and M ∈ M r \ M s . Then M ∩ N ∈ M s and the compatibility between α and M ∩ N in s is transfered to the compatibility between α and M . The only potential problem would be, just as in the proof of the previous lemma, if α ≥ sup(M ∩ N ) and α ∈ Lim(C γ ) for some γ ∈ D r \ D s . But as we saw, Lim(C γ ) ∩ N = ∅, because C γ ∩ δ N is a finite set.
Clause ( Proof. P has the ω 3 -c.c. because, assuming 2 ω1 = ω 2 , |P | = ω 2 . Hence it preserves cardinals ≥ ω 3 . It preserves ω 2 because it is ω 2 -presaturated. And it preserves ω 1 because it is proper. √ Lemma 5.13. Let κ be a regular cardinal > ω. Suppose that C ⊂ Lim(κ + ) is a club of κ + and C α | α ∈ C is a square-like sequence. Then there exists a square sequence on κ + .
Proof. The idea is to throw away every ordinal which is not in C, effectively making C equal to κ + . In fact, keeping only limit points of C will suffice. Thus, let E := Lim(C) \ {κ + }. E is stil a club of κ + . For every α ∈ Lim(E) \ {κ + } define D α := C α ∩ E. Since E ∩ α is a club in α for every α ∈ Lim(E) \ {κ + }, D α is a club in α. Suppose that β ∈ Lim(D α ) for some β < α. Then β is a limit point of both E and C α , and D β = C β ∩ E = C α ∩ β ∩ E = D α ∩ β. Also, if cf(α) < κ then |D α | < κ. Hence, D α | α ∈ Lim(E) \ {κ + } is a square-like sequence. Let {γ i | i < κ + } be an increasing enumeration of E. For i ∈ Lim(κ + ) define
. It is a club in i because γ is a continuous function. Let us prove that E i | i ∈ Lim(κ + ) is a square sequence. If i < j and i ∈ Lim(E j ) then γ i ∈ Lim(D γj ). Hence, D γi = D γj ∩ γ i . Therefore,
